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"HIS" AND "HER" STORY: THE LIFE AND FUTURE OF
THE LAW AND SOCIETY MOVEMENT
FELICE J. LEVINE*
D AVID TRUBEK tells "his story" of the law and society move-
ment based on reflections of his personal history and largely lo-
cates his perspective within the intellectual struggles that have
occurred in the law school. While acknowledging that there are other
frames of reference, his story, told with a tone of pessimism, describes
the evolution of the law and society movement almost exclusively
from the vantage of the law school and legal scholarship. Trubek re-
flects on the twenty-five year history of the law and society movement
based on a critical assessment of the field and the forces shaping it,
and calls for new ideas, definitions, and directions for sociolegal stud-
ies.
Besides being law-school based, his model is essentially cross-sec-
tional and static: dividing the law and society movement into its past,
present, and future. He contrasts the past with the contemporary pe-
riod where-in his view-the original purpose has lost its force and
there is no longer an abiding belief or faith in the potency and perfec-
tion of law or of social science. He then looks to the future in light of
this past, this crisis of confidence about the present, and his hopes
and recommendations for the future.
Juxtaposed to "his story" is an alternative view which I presented
in response to his Mason Ladd Memorial Lecture at Florida State
University in February 1989 and in my Presidential Address to the
Law and Society Association in June of that same year on the occa-
sion of the Association's twenty-fifth anniversary.' "Her story" (i.e.,
my story) acknowledges the influence of the law school world and le-
* Director, Law and Social Science Program, National Science Foundation. This Article
is based on my comments delivered on February 24, 1989, in response to the 1989 Mason Ladd
Memorial Lecture at the Florida State University given by David Trubek. Although the revised
version of Trubek's lecture sought to accommodate the issues raised by my and other, comments,
his essential message and my response remain the same. My thinking about this topic over the
years has been enriched and refined by conversations with many colleagues. In particular, I wish
to thank Ronald M. Pipkin, who helped to debate the issues that led to my initial comments, and
Katherine Rosich, who raised questions and offered suggestions that helped me refine my ideas
in written form. Also, Frank Munger, Richard Lempert, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Barbara
Yngvesson, Shari Seidman Diamond, and Stewart Macaulay have been ongoing participants in
this lively exchange.
1. Levine, Goose Bumps and the .- Search for Signs of Intelligent Life" in Sociolegal Stud-
ies: After Twenty-Five Years, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 7 (1990).
70 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 18:69
gal scholarship on the law and society movement and on the Law and
Society Association, but locates the evolution of sociolegal studies in
the context of social inquiry more generally. I see the history and the
future of law and society as residing at the interdisciplinary intersec-
tion of the social sciences, including but not privileging law-trained
participants attracted to empirical inquiry on law-related matters.
Thus, my story places the origins of the law and society idea in differ-
ent sources and with different points of emphasis.
The model I propose views the field more broadly and does not see
the same historical or contemporary tensions that Trubek postulates,
or at least does not consider them unique to law and society work. My
perspective conceives of the field in more heterogeneous, dynamic,
and longitudinal terms. Whether the basic difference between Trubek
and me reflects our respective levels of optimism or alternative con-
ceptions of the place and role of the law school, there is no doubt that
I examine the past and look to-the future with a different orientation.
This Article describes my alternative conception, and in so doing
responds to the issues raised by David Trubek. I begin by describing
what the law and society idea is, its origins and development, and its
relationship to law school and legal scholarship. Then, I offer an al-
ternative view of where sociolegal studies is, whether the issues trou-
blesome to Trubek are as characteristic of the past or present as he
fears, and whether and in what ways our different "stories" affect
our aspirations for the future.
I. WHAT LAW AND SOCIETY IS ABOUT
As I use the term "law and society," it denotes the social study of
law, legal process, legal systems, law-related behaviors, and what is
endemically legal or law-like in society. I prefer the term "sociolegal
studies" 2 as a synonym for "law and society" because it is inherently
interdisciplinary and can integrate and extend the classical characteri-
zations that derive from the older disciplines (e.g., empirical study
within legal scholarship, sociology of law, anthropology of law, psy-
chology and law, legal history, public law, judicial process, criminol-
ogy, law and economics). However broad the scope, it is meant to
embrace the study of law as a social phenomenon, not the use of so-
cial science in or by law.
2. This term has come increasingly into usage in the late 1980's to characterize this schol-
arly field of inquiry and the interdisciplinary fusion it represents. Used interchangeably with
"law and society," the latter term being also the name of the Association (i.e., the Law and
Society Association), which is the leading scholarly organization of the field.
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The field of sociolegal studies has several goals: to expand funda-
mental knowledge about legal process; to explain and understand pat-
terns, departures, and changes within it; to study the interrelationship
between the legal system and other social and cultural systems of soci-
ety; and to understand what I have called the role of law-with a little
"l"-in normative ordering.' While most work in the field has fo-
cused primarily on formal and informal institutions and processes re-
lating to state legal systems, the domain of sociolegal studies includes
law that occurs in a variety of locations-including the family, the
school, the friendship circle, and the workplace. 4
Who does it? That, too, comes from a variety of locations. We use
as shorthand "law and social science," but it is not really divisible
into two parts. Law academics have been drawn to pursuing this kind
of empirical understanding of law and legal process, but so too have
sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, psychologists, econo-
mists, and historians, among others. As the field has developed, the
interdisciplinary integration has produced not separate disciplines fo-
cusing on isolated legal phenomena, but a commonality of interest
that is much more than the sum of its constituent parts.
The conception of law and social science as a series of "law-ands"
is not a particularly functional characterization. What has been most
engaging and sustaining about sociolegal studies as a field of inquiry
is that instead of remaining distinctive interest groups based on disci-
pline of origin, subfield specialties across disciplinary boundaries have
evolved. In those subfields, scholars organize their work tolerant of
the perspective of others and generate fresh insights out of that very
diversity of interest. Just as political science with its focus on the pol-
ity and political process has subfields of inquiry (e.g., international
relations, electoral behavior, political economy), similarly sociolegal
studies has evolved subfield specialties. Irrespective of their disciplines
of training, scholars working on procedural justice, crime causation,
regulatory enforcement, or deterrence-to name but a few-build on
each other's work, challenge each other's assumptions, share comple-
mentary goals and objectives, and find that they have more in com-
mon than they do with others who received the same degree but
turned to other areas of inquiry.
From a research and teaching perspective, no area of sociolegal in-
quiry is the exclusive province of any one discipline. For example,
while some social psychologists study juries through their small
3. Levine, supra note 1, at 22-24.
4. See infra pp. 76-78.
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groups tools, political scientists, economists, and historians also look
at the nature of legal decision making and often focus on the jury as
an episode of public participation in legal contexts. Among the clas-
sics in the field is the Chicago Jury Study,5 conceived in the early
1950's and funded by the Ford Foundation as part of an empirical
research program established- at the University of Chicago. Even
though many jury studies were and are done by social psychologists,
that work was undertaken by Harry Kalven, a law-trained social scien-
tist of law, and Hans Zeisel, a sociologist.
II. ORIGINS OF SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES
A. "His" Law-Centered Vision
In the revised text of the Mason Ladd Memorial Lecture, David
Trubek acknowledges the construction of law and society as a social
discipline, but essentially sees the field as dominated by legal thought,
the legal academy, and legal elites.6 While he recognizes that the law
and society idea was impelled by building a social science of law, 7 his
reference points remain the legal profession, law schools, and legal
scholarship as the context and culture of sociolegal work.' From this
vantage, he maintains that law and society was a movement of the
1960's, linked to the progressive political agenda of legal elites9-in-
cluding the notion that law was the answer to the social flaws and ills
of that period. 0
Part of his rationale for focusing on the law school and legal schol-
arship rests on his view that legal education controls all forms of legal
study." Taking this as a premise, he examines the legal environment-
in particular legal realism and its successor, "imperial law"-where in
his view, law and society has its roots. Most of his assessment of what
5. In addition to the numerous articles growing out of this study, the most visible publica-
tion was H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AimaEmc JuRy (1966).
6. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement,
18 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1, 7 (1990).
7. Id. at 5-6.
8. See id. at 13 n.27. Throughout his paper, Trubek's reference points for law and society
remain the law school and legal studies even as he examines the relationship of social science and
social scientists. See id. at 46-47. Other law-trained commentators have similarly considered the
relationship between law and society and legal scholarship. See, e.g., Schlegel, Notes Toward an
Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36
STAN. L. Rsv. 391 (1984); White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellec-
tual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819 (1986); Whitford, Lowered Horizons: Implementation Research in
a Post-CLS World, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 755.
9. Trubek, supra note 6, at 7-8.
10. See id. at 8-9 (Trubek's discussion of "legalism" and "legalists").
11. Seeid. at 15 n.33.
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impelled the creation of the law and society field reflects his concerns
about the operational assumptions that motivated legal realism and
imperial law. Although I share Trubek's appraisal of the limits of le-
gal realism and imperial law, particularly as they influenced law re-
form and the law and development project of the 1960's,2 his
assumptions about their impact on law and society as a scholarly field
create an aura of connectedness that may only be true, if at all, for
those trained in law.
B. "Her" Non-Law-Centered Vision
The twenty-fifth anniversary of the Law and Society Association in
1989 provided me with an opportunity to reflect on some of the same
issues raised by Trubek about the development of sociolegal studies
and of the Law and Society Association (LSA). At that time, I exam-
ined the growth of the field through the lens of LSA and found the
enterprise to be pluralistic, dynamic, and self-reflective since its begin-
ning. While I will not reiterate the details of that history here, 3 the
interdisciplinary breadth and reach of law and society and LSA can be
seen from its inception.
Perhaps the most important sign that the movement' was not. law
school driven is evident from the founding of LSA itself. Although
law-trained people were key to the growth of the field in the early
years, the effort was not impelled by legal scholars. Indeed, the idea
of a Law and Society Association was spawned at a gathering con-
vened by sociologists at the annual meeting of the American Sociolog-
ical Association in September 1964 in Montreal. Discussions at that
meeting focused on whether a separate section of the American Socio-
logical Association should be created or whether this group should be-
come a free-standing society and be open to other disciplines.
Ultimately, interdisciplinary outreach prevailed. After a one-year pe-
riod of consideration, the decision was made to become free-standing
and to welcome all forms of social science scholarship on law to
LSA-including the scholarship of law-trained persons who were in-
terested in participating in this empirical enterprise.
Parallel to the formation of LSA in 1964 (the official filing of the
certification of incorporation was November 17, 1964), much of sub-
12. Trubek's personal narrative about his work at USAID, see id. at 22-23, and his and
others' experiences with "law and development projects," see id. at 36 n.71, help to explain
Trubek's perceptions of the limits of the law. These accounts, however, refer to experiences of
legal scholars functioning as lawyers in action programs and law reform efforts. Although some
of the same people were involved or became involved in law and society, the two activities are
distinct. Thus, the criticisms that are appropriate to one are not necessarily relevant to the other.
13. See Levine, supra note 1, at 9-20.
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stance on law and society was also being planned in the traditional
social science disciplines. In 1965, law and society meetings were con-
vened as part of the annual meetings of the American Political Science
Association and the American Anthropological Association. Even be-
fore such activity surfaced within professional associations, there were
other indicators of social science interest in sociolegal studies. For ex-
ample, in April 1964, the Wenner-Gren Foundation sponsored a con-
ference on the anthropology of law at the Center for Advanced Study
in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California. Two years later
Wenner-Gren sponsored a second international conference in Austria
to stimulate the study of legal systems in cultural and societal con-
texts.' 4
This is not to say that the impetus was entirely or primarily from
sociology or social science. There was activity and interest in empirical
work on law within the law school world as well. The philosophy of
science underlying the initial conception of law and society was that
law-trained people should be drawn into the enterprise of sociolegal
studies and that teaching and research would be enriched by law and
social science collaboration. While at a substantive level the aim was
for a social science of law, at an operational level there was an early
emphasis on joining law with other disciplines as a way of advancing
the scholarly enterprise.
There is no doubt that this emphasis on conjoining law with social
science strongly influenced the shape of the field.' 5 The structure of
funding through conferences, training, and the support of law and so-
ciety centers 6 reflects an interest in building sociolegal studies through
interaction of legal scholars with social scientists. Early on, in the
1950's, the Ford Foundation, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the
Walter E. Meyer Research Institute (succeeded by the Council on
Law-Related Studies) sought to encourage the participation of law
professors in this interdisciplinary enterprise. Ford Foundation sup-
port for research in law and the behavioral sciences at the University
of Chicago Law School in the 1950's galvanized interest in bringing
14. These meetings were organized by Laura Nader, anthropologist at the University of
California at Berkeley. The products of the second conference were published in LAW IN Cut-
TuPE AND SOCIETv (L. Nader ed. 1969).
15. Since 1964, there have been twelve LSA presidents, seven of whom have been law-
trained. Joel Handler, who becomes president in July of 1991, is also law-trained.
16. The law and society centers supported by the Russell Sage Foundation at the University
of California, Berkeley, the University of Wisconsin, Northwestern University, the University of
Denver, and somewhat later at Yale University emphasized interdisciplinary training' and in-
volvement across law and social science. See Levine, supra note 1, at 12 n.7. For a detailed
description of the role of the Russell Sage Foundation, see LAW AND T SOCI. SCmNCES 1-10
(L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986).
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law professors and social scientists together in interdisciplinary ex-
change. Also in the 1950's, the Social Science Research Council initi-
ated summer institutes in law and social science. The first of four was
held at Harvard in 1956: Law-trained scholars including Harold Ber-
man, Willard Hurst, Karl Llewellyn, and Soia Mentschikoff ex-
changed ideas with social scientists Richard Schwartz, E. Adamson
Hoebel, and others. 17 Another indicator of law-trained involvement
was the incorporation of the American Bar Foundation in 1952 by the
American Bar Association and its establishment as a research insti-
tute. Through such activity and other social networks and patterns of
communication, numerous legal scholars became engaged and active
in the field.
This history demonstrates that the law school was an important
player, but not the only or necessarily the lead player, in creating law
and society. Also, although legal realism and related traditions of le-
gal scholarship were for some academics a part of their ancestry, as
with any new life form, the genetic composition is highly textured and
multiply determined. In 1965, at one of the earliest symposia con-
vened by the Law and Society Association in cooperation with the
American Sociological Association and the Society for the Study of
Social Problems, Jerome Skolnick emphasized this very same point.
Like others in the law and society enterprise at that time, Skolnick
acknowledged the intellectual heritage to law-particularly to legal re-
alism, and to other disciplines. Yet, he distinguished between this new
effort that began in the 1950's and was "only just emerging at the
turn of the sixties.' 8 Although Skolnick appreciated the importance
of the legal realist movement, he thought its "most direct contribution
was in socializing a generation of law professors who would be dis-
posed to sociological interests in living law."19
III. UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
A considerable portion of David Trubek's effort is devoted to cri-
tiques of what he postulated to be the original understanding of law
and society. His criticisms seem to be applicable to legal realism and
what he calls imperial law; however, by embedding law and society in
these traditions of legal scholarship, he generalizes-in my view, he
overgeneralizes-his concerns. The specific issues that are trouble-
17. See Schwartz, President's Message: To Ad Hoebel- With Thanks, 7 LAw & Soc'y REv.
531 (1973).
18. See Skolnick, The Sociology of Law in America: Overview and Trends, 13 Soc. PROn-
LEmS 4, 5 (Supp. Summer 1965).
19. Id. at 8.
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some to Trubek are (1) that law and society were viewed as a closed
system, (2) that law was seen as an unproblematic source of normative
order, (3) that the field sought disengagement from law and politics,
yet (4) that it was centrally motivated by the impetus for immediate
policy impacts, and (5) that science evades normative thought and as-
sumes an objective reality. These "understandings" would be equally
troublesome to me if I thought they essentially characterized either the
formation or the continuation of the field.
I do not mean to imply that contemporary critiques from Trubek or
others20 are not useful and should not help to contribute to construc-
tive reflection and improvement. As I see it, however, the issues of
concern to Trubek have always been part of the texture of the field,
and, in that sense, greater attentiveness to them neither requires a "re-
versal" of field 2' nor a radical intervention. In responding to the Ma-
son Ladd Memorial Lecture and in my Presidential Address, I
examined current critiques in light of, not in opposition to, law and
society's past. That assessment remains germane in this context.
A. Law and Society as a Closed System
The first of Trubek's criticisms is directed to the conception of "so-
ciety as a system." While his concerns about the limits of Parsonian
notions of structural-functionalism are well taken, 22 his argument is
much more applicable to traditional legal scholarship than to work in
the law and society enterprise. His view that society was understood to
be "a tightly integrated system of interrelated elements or structures"
and that these structures perform functions that are "objectively
necessary ' 23 seems to misconstrue the "law and society" idea. Soci-
olegal studies as much departed from as embraced the assumptions of
structural-functionalism that were so influential in social science in the
1950's and 1960's. At its inception, the field sought to pull the legal
system apart: Instead of taking formal law as objectively necessary or
given, it made problematic its boundaries and borders and what it
does.
20. See, e.g., Abel, Redirecting Social Studies of Law, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 805 (1980);
Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POL'Y 149
(1984); Sarat & Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAW & POL'Y 97 (1985); Silbey &
Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 165 (1988); Tru-
bek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1984);
Trubek & Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program or Pan-
dora's Box?, 14 LAW & Soc. INQuiRY 3 (1989).
21. Trubek, supra note 6, at 51-54.
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id. at 31-32.
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The core of the "law and society" idea was to conceive of law and
law-related processes and behaviors as a social process that might best
be understood as a part of and embedded in broader social and cul-
tural contexts. To the extent that scholars like Lawrence Friedman
and Stewart Macaulay organized their work around a "system"
idea,24 it was intended to offer an alternative to doctrinal models and
to foster a conception of law, not as fixed or structurally necessary,
but as a social institution integral to society. From this vantage, soci-
olegal studies was instrumental in encouraging a perception of both
"law" and "society" as an open system. Law was not assumed to be
a closed system functioning in hydraulic or regularized ways. If any-
thing, law was envisioned to be a dynamic, interactive, and loosely
coupled system that is interwoven in and with the fabric of society. 25
Relaxing assumptions even about the centrality of law and its
boundaries has always been part of what has animated the field. From
the outset, sociolegal studies took seriously the idea that it is impor-
tant to examine the realities of law-including the social arrange-
ments, distributional consequences, and norms produced by its formal
and informal institutional processes-and to focus beyond state law to
the rule systems and social control mechanisms that structure and reg-
ulate other social contexts. Studying law with a little "1" locates and
looks at law broadly in, for example, the family, the school, the work-
place, or the market. This perspective seeks to understand law's or-
ganization, its governance structures, its sanctioning systems, and its
relevance to the quality and quantity of social exchange. This interest
in interpreting and looking at "legal matter" as it occurs and is dis-
persed in a variety of locations and settings can be seen in sociolegal
work dating back to the 1960's and early 1970's by such scholars as
Sally Falk Moore, Philip Selznick, and June Louin Tapp. 26 It remains
an interest of currency and importance today. 27
Questioning the very boundaries and scope of law even produced
some tension and uncertainty for a field endeavoring to define itself.
24. Id. at 31 n.55.
25. For example, in his writing Friedman emphasized that "[t]here is, of course, no 'true'
definition of law .... Geometrically, the figure is rough and imperfect, but it is close enough to
the circle for our use." L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SocIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 10-11
(1975) (emphasis added).
26. See P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Moore, Law and So-
cial Change: The Semi-autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW &
Soc'v REv. 719 (1973); Tapp, Reflections, 27(2) J. Soc. IssuEs 1 (1971).
27. In a very engaging paper, Silbey and Sarat reaffirmed the importance of studying soci-
olegal phenomena beyond state law to a variety of "places and spaces" and saw this perspective
as being integral to "critical empiricism" on law. Silbey & Sarat, supra note 20, at 166.
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In 1976, Marc Galanter-then editor of the Law & Society Review-
revealed this tentativeness when he asked:
Can there be a field of 'law and society' if it is not held together by
the normative vision of legal learning? . . We seem to pursue a field
of inquiry whose ambit is defined by reference to a kind of learning
that we reject as inadequate. In exposing the law's claims to
autonomy and displaying its continuity with other aspects of social
life, we seem to undermine the possibility of a coherent and self-
contained field of inquiry which addresses it.2
One explanation of this ambivalence may flow from the influence of
legal scholarship on law-trained sociolegal scholars. Another explana-
tion might reflect the apprehension that a broad definition of bounda-
ries might strip this incipient field of a field.29 Whatever underlies this
uncertainty about the consequences of a broad conceptualization, it
suggests that the original understanding in law and society was not of
a fixed, certain, and closed system, but, on the contrary, a fluid one.
B. Law as an Unproblematic Source of Normative Guidance
Trubek also criticizes the original understanding of law and society
as seeing law as a univocal or unproblematic source of normative
guidance. In making his point, he refers to the longstanding tradition
of "gap" studies3 ° that focused on the "impact" of law or sought to
show the disjunctures between "law on th6, books" and "law-in-ac-
tion." As Trubek views it, by starting with "'law," research accepted
a univocal vision of the legal system and accorded it validity, cer-
tainty, and legitimacy.
As a caution, Trubek's position is well taken. I have already em-
phasized the importance that sociolegal studies not be overdetermined
by problems or conceptualizations that flow from the legal system,
legal academy, or legal scholarship. Others3' too have cautioned about
the ofttimes limited or even skewed understandings that can issue
28. Galanter, From the Editor, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 483, 487 (1976).
29. Seeing sociolegal studies broadly as embracing the study of law, law-like processes, and
law-related behaviors is not, in my view, inconsistent with the notion of an integrated field or
discipline. See Levine, supra note 1, at 23-24. See also Levine & Pipkin, Graduate Programs in
Sociolegal Studies: A Requisite for the Future, 4(1) Focus ON L. STUD. 4 (1988).
30. Trubek, supra note 6, at 36.
31. See Abel, supra note 20; Sarat & Silbey, supra note 20; Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and
Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate Persistence of a Research Tradition, 9 LEGAL STUD.
F. 23 (1985).
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from concentrating work on only "impacts" and "gaps." Also, with
benefit of several decades of research experience, there may now be
more awareness of the limitations of scrutinizing only the gaps. As a
commentary on the original position, however, Trubek's critique
seems misplaced.
Studies that issued in the early years on law-in-action, legal impact,
or implementation were more likely to take law, not as precepts with
normative validity, but as points of departure for then scrutinizing
and illuminating the realities of "legal life." Depending upon the con-
text or problem of study, scholars may have as much questioned a
particular set of laws or legal arrangements as accepted them as a
source of normative validity. Although the period of the late 1950's
and early 1960's may have reflected some hope that law reform could
ameliorate social problems and make a difference on issues of social
justice, the interest in studying law was not motivated by an undiffer-
entiated acceptance of law.
To make his point, Trubek analyzes the law and development pro-
ject as an instance of accepting law as an undifferentiated source of
guidance. Earlier,32 I located the law and development movement
within the framework of law reform and legal action, despite some
overlapping membership in the participants, as essentially not an epi-
sode in law and society history. Although I am sympathetic to his cri-
tique of the limits of that movement and its failure to appreciate the
ethnocentricism involved in transporting modern law to developing
countries, the project itself was basically an enterprise of the legal
profession and the legal academy. Thus, it is more appropriately a
subject of sociolegal studies than a critique of it.
Sociolegal research on the imposition of law and legal pluralism
that aimed to isolate and illuminate the impact of western systems on
local cultures did not take the imposition of western law as a social
good. Although such studies can also have their enthnocentricism and
can fail miserably to capture the perceptions and interpretations of
those involved, this problem-taken up later33-is different from con-
ceptualizing law as unproblematic or as virtuous. Trubek's challenge
to be critical and to avoid complacency in making or accepting as-
sumptions about law is a wise one. I see this challenge, however, as
part of the original understanding, and, although never realized per-
fectly, certainly it was never "suppressed" or "evaded. ' 34
32. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
33. See infra pp. 85-87.
34. Trubek, supra note 6, at 37.
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Again I return to the view that Trubek's concerns are more appro-
priately directed to law or perhaps to legal scholarship than to original
understandings in law and society. His consideration of recent legal
scholarship in critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, and critical
race theory is important, but more germane to law and legal doctrine.
This connectedness is most evident in the two instances where Trubek
discusses how feminist jurisprudence offers a critique of legal assump-
tions about the objective necessity and normative validity of legal
structures or the univocality of doctrine. 5
The feminist critique itself makes good sense. It is widely recog-
nized that social interaction-including that related to law-and
scholarly discourse at least through the 1950's and 1960's showed little
awareness of the power, purpose, and impact of male domination. In
contrast to traditional legal scholarship, however, the field of law and
society, with its focus on examining the empirical realities and conse-
quences of law and identifying complexities and underlying dynamics,
invariably raised questions about the normative validity of extant
structures, functions, and impacts of the legal system. From that van-
tage, the kind of question-raising about law that derives from sociole-
gal studies helped to create an environment ultimately more
sympathetic to the issues and insights offered in the 1970's and 1980's
by feminist jurisprudence. Although Trubek's discussion of feminist
critiques of law is certainly relevant to legal doctrine and doctrinal
scholarship, it is less clear how his observations are a critique of soci-
olegal studies.36 This is not to say that there are not important criti-
cisms of social science from feminist philosophers and sociologists of
science that do pertain to law and society. Later, I consider the impor-
tance of these critiques.3 7
C. Disengaged from Law and Politics...
In addition to his critique of how law and society conceived of law,
Trubek also raises questions about the initial conception of the enter-
prise itself. He finds particularly troublesome what he considers the
need to conceptualize the field in objective terms that separate itself
from law and from politics. Here, too, the characterization seems
overdrawn.
35. Id. at 31-32, 37-38.
36. In recent years, feminist critiques of law have been generating important new questions
that require empirical study and should transform the ways that sociolegal scholars conceptualize
law-related problems. How law functions to subordinate women, how legal institutions them-
selves are gender-based and stratified, and how legal processes produce gender-biased outcomes
are but a few of the essential questions for law and society research.
37. See infra pp. 85-87.
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The effort to define the law and society enterprise in its own terms
and as distinct from traditional legal scholarship did not necessarily
indicate the intention to separate from the larger social context or to
deny social relevance or responsibility. In departing from doctrinal
analysis and pulling toward a new enterprise, perhaps law-trained col-
leagues pursuing empirical research may have seen themselves as mar-
ginal to the law school world.3 8 However, this contrast with legal
scholarship did not necessarily imply a disengagement from law or
politics for law academics or social scientists. In 1966, in the introduc-
tion to the first issue of the Law and Society Review, then Editor Ri-
chard Schwartz39 observed an interdisciplinary interest in both
knowledge about law and in information of value to legal policy. He
emphasized, however, that the "crucial task" was gaining a theoreti-
cal understanding of law as part of the social order.
In taking as its task this commitment to building fundamental em-
pirical knowledge, sociolegal studies did not aim to avoid the political
dimensions or ramifications of its work. From the outset, there was
recognition that research itself is not exempt from the politics that are
internal or external to a field. Every social process has its value and
status hierarchies, and, although preferences in theory, method, or
context may vary with time, academic "politics" can subtly affect
what is or is not done. Also, to the extent that research is an integral
part of broader social processes, the production of knowledge is itself
political. 4° Whether or not the call is new, Trubek's concerns about
conceptualizing science as disengaged from society and his urgings
that scientists take responsibility for the impacts of their work are
messages that cannot be sounded frequently enough.
41
38. The implication of much of Trubek's paper is that law and society is perhaps less mar-
ginal in law schools than it once was both because it is better established and because the legal
academic culture has radically transformed. Trubek, supra note 6, at 36, 45-46. The issue of
marginality vis-a-vis one's field of training seems to be more the preoccupation of law-trained
colleagues than those trained in the social science disciplines. Perhaps the prestige hierarchies are
more rigid within the law school world because there is more consensus about the dominant
paradigm (whether critical or supportive). Or, perhaps, empirical study of social phenomena is
the "stuff" of social science training, but, for law-trained colleagues, "joining the sociolegal
tour" represents a greater departure from the prevailing professional culture of their "home"
departments. Galanter's calling "law and society" discourse a "second legal learning" shows
that legal scholarship is a point of comparison for law-trained colleagues in ways that are likely
not felt by social-science trained colleagues. See Galanter, The Legal Malaise; or, Justice Ob-
served, 19 LAW & Soc', Rv. 537 (1985).
39. Schwartz, From the Editor.... 1 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 6 (1966).
40. See also Sarat & Silbey, supra note'20; Trubek & Esser, supra note 20.
41. The role and complexity of the social sciences addressing social issues and problems
have been topics of considerable tension and attention especially since World War II. See, e.g.,
Kelman, The Social Consequences of Social Research: A New Issue, 21(3) J. OF Soc. IssuEs 21
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The tensions and difficult choices between basic and applied re-
search, between theoretical and policy-oriented concerns, and between
political and policy interests that are endemic to science can be seen in
the formation and functioning of any field-including sociolegal stud-
ies. Although sociolegal work was and is driven by an interest in "so-
cial science of law" and not "social science in law," 42 there has been
both ambivalence and rumination about the meaningfulness of re-
search, the value or limitation of addressing politically "hot" topics,
the potential for "capture" or being "captured," and the extent to
which law or legal policy has implicitly or explicitly determined the
shape and substance of sociolegal work. 43 This rumination has a long
history. In 1965, at the first Law and Society symposium, Skolnick"
grappled with the tension between basic and applied research and cau-
tioned against drawing precise lines instead of developing theoretical
issues on whatever the problem.
The fact that this rumination is generic and recurrent does not make
it any less consequential. Undergirding research, there are always the
questions of what to do and when or whether to do it, and there are
no easy answers. Academics who have dedicated their careers to re-
search and teaching regularly experience this tension between "know-
ing" and "doing." 45 Given that time and space for research are not
infinite, it is obviously difficult and challenging to reconcile goals, as-
pirations, and often competing demands. Also, scholars differ in the
extent to which they believe their work can or should have immediate
relevance and, as frequently, they themselves change depending upon
the problems being pursued or their own sets of experience or frustra-
tion with their work. 46 For example, in a 1974 article on scholars' par-
(1965) (written almost contemporaneously with the founding of Law and Society). In the 1970's,
June Louin Tapp and I also addressed the reluctance and responsibility of scholars to pursue
sociolegal research that is engaged and reflective. See Tapp, supra note 26, at 1-2; Tapp & Lev-
ine, Reflections and Redirections, in LAW, JusTicE, AND THE INiDvIDuAL IN SoCIETY: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL AND LEGAL IssuEs 3-5 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977).
42. Among others, Lawrence Friedman made this same distinction in describing the orien-
tation of the field. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763, 778
(1986). See also J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (1985) (exemplifying the
latter tradition).
43. See Abel, supra note 20; Sarat & Silbey, supra note 20.
44. Skolnick, supra note 18, at 23-24.
45. Because law school and the legal profession are practice and public-policy oriented, law
professors may exhibit more heightened awareness of or pressure to work in ways that are more
relevant to or consistent with political values and policy agendas. But, if these issues are height-
ened for law-trained scholars, they are certainly not unique to them. While the intensity and level
of interest may vary among individuals, the issue of social responsibility is never absent.
46. In a very fine paper on feminism and the science of psychology, Anne Peplau and Eva
Conrad reflected on feminist research and feminist methodology. See Peplau & Conrad, Beyond
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ticipation in the law and development movement, 47 Trubek and
Galanter lamented the consequences of being deceived or coopted by
the policy and political motives of governments and lawyers in the
United States and in developing nations. Yet, in the Mason Ladd Me-
morial Lecture and in this paper, Trubek calls on sociolegal scholars
to become more politically engaged.
This seeming contradiction is more the rule than the exception.
Even among less activist colleagues than Trubek, there is a sense that
one's work should be relevant and important. It may be endemic to
the scholarly condition to experience enduring ambivalence-an ap-
proach/approach, avoid/avoid conflict of sorts. Yet, for those who
have chosen careers in teaching and research, there is abundant op-
portunity for fundamental work on politically important issues (such
as race, gender, ethnic conflict) without sacrificing scholarly integrity
to political statement.
For sociolegal scholars committed to building fundamental knowl-
edge about law-related processes, this duality is not new even within
the same individual, let alone across our colleagues. There was no
univocal voice, as some like Trubek might suggest, from sociolegal
research in the past; there is no single message today, and there is no
reason to expect an authoritative resolution in the future, nor should
we seek one.
D. Yet... Eager for Impacts
Trubek finds the original understanding wanting in large measure
because sociolegal scholars were preoccupied with seeking to produce
objective knowledge. He takes the view that objectivist conceptions
require a stance of neutrality toward particular interests and visions of
social life that lead and led to disengagement from law, politics, and
normative judgments. Seeing objectivity as a core tenet of positivist
social science, he criticizes this notion as both inhibiting legal and po-
litical engagement (already discussed) and promoting a view of true
knowledge that was there to be used.
Non-Sexist Research: The Perils of Feminist Methods in Psychology, 13 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN
Q. 379 (1989). They called for a diversity of research topics, methods, and goals; the legitimacy
of both problem-centered and basic research; and reflection on the role of personal values. They
argued that there are a variety of opportunities for action and that scholars have to be conscious
of the potential implications of their work but not have as a litmus test being action-oriented or
applied. Indeed, while supportive of a range of approaches, they cautioned that action-oriented
work can also redefine the issues being studied in ways that are limiting and that fundamental
work should not be constrained by the absence of an overt implication. Id.
47. Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in
Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062.
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Much of Trubek's uneasiness about early and contemporary work48
in law and society stems from his assumptions that social science
shrouds itself and what it observes in an objectivist framework of
value neutrality. Sidestepping the debates in science that date back to
the 1960's about value-free and value-neutral work, he posits a univo-
cal "science" and univocal "law and society" that sought to ascertain
and impart truth but that showed little awareness that the scientific
enterprise itself affects the shape of that knowledge. In the next sec-
tion, I present an alternative conception of sociolegal studies as sci-
ence.4 9 Most important here is Trubek's vision that, in producing
authoritative and objective knowledge, law and society scholars, how-
ever much they were disengaged from law and politics, expected their
knowledge to have authority and make a difference in social life.
The expectation of social researchers that their work would make a
difference, however naive or even misplaced, was certainly not a fatal
flaw if true. Undoubtedly, many of the first generation of scholars
who were attracted to empirical work on law harbored a hope that
their scholarship would have an impact. Some likely even turned to
social science, as opposed to other areas of work or other areas of
science, out of an interest in dealing with issues of social relevance.
Furthermore, sociolegal scholars certainly were not unaware of the
potential political impact and political importance of the issues that
were being addressed-whether it was work on the delivery of legal
services for the poor,50 work on policing,51 or work on the stratifica-
tion of the legal profession.5 2 Appreciating, however, that knowledge
on such issues can have important consequences did not mean that the
dominant impetus was to look for immediate policy impacts.
Essentially, as I see it, in the formation of law and society, there
was great diversity in the form and intensity of social engagement and
in the motivation for relevance and political or policy impact. Fur-
48. From Trubek's vantage, there is still a reluctance to abandon "objectivism" with all of
the trappings he ascribes to it. Trubek, supra note 6, at 46-47. In examining what he believes to
be a now current and more critical approach to sociolegal studies than was characteristic of its
past (what he has termed "critical empiricism"), Trubek continues to find as a sticking point an
"unwillingness to abandon some form of objectivism." Id. at 50. While I am sympathetic to
what has been called "critical empiricism," I find it more continuous with traditions of the past
in its thrust and critiques than as discontinuous from it. The prior discussion should make that
clear.
49. See infra pp. 85-87.
50. See, e.g., J. CARLIN, J. HowARD & S. MESSINOER, CIvIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR: ISSUES
FOR SOCIOLEGAL RESEARCH (1967).
51. See, e.g., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SocIETY (1967).
52. See, e.g., Ladinsky, The Impact of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practice
and the Law, 16 J. oF LEGAL EDUC. 127 (1963).
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ther, to the extent that scholars sought to make a difference, there is
little indication that the desire to have an impact flowed from a vision
of perfect or objective truth. Both in the past and present, there was
less confidence or arrogance than Trubek implies. While scholars
sought to draw inferences and offer generalization and explanation,
the prevailing view did not assume that social knowledge was abso-
lute, perfect, or fixed.
E. Sociolegal Studies as Science
"His" story and "her" story (i.e., Trubek's and mine) perhaps
most diverge in their conceptions of sociolegal studies as science. De-
spite the many accomplishments of law and society that Trubek notes,
his story focuses on the limitations and constraints of social science;
my story sees social science as having brought new ways of conceptu-
alizing and observing law and law-related processes. Trubek is con-
cerned about abuses that might follow from substituting the authority
of science for the authority of law. He see social science as falsely
assuming an objective reality; I see social science as the process of
seeking to be objective about subjective events and experiences-in-
cluding science.
Essentially, Trubek's critique of social science derives from the con-
cerns alluded to above: That science abates normative thought; that
science assumes an objective reality; and that much of science denies
that it is part of the process of social life and social relations. To the
extent that sociolegal work represents extremes on such dimensions,
inattention to these issues would be problematic. In terms of actual
work, however, past or present, sociolegal studies as a scholarly enter-
prise would not be characterized in such terms.
My view of sociolegal studies as science is based on looking at the
nature of the activity. I see science as a form of work, not a set of
graduate degrees (witness the professional social science done by scho-
lars with only legal training). It is certainly not the only form of valu-
able work, but work of value nonetheless. Science as a mode of work
is a way of building knowledge through the development of ideas
grounded in or examined against observing, collecting, accumulating,
scrutinizing, or even at times altering the empirical realities of life. As
a mode of work we do, it is a mode of work we are obliged to exam-
ine.
Criticisms from within sociolegal studies about the value-neutrality
of scholarship, the determinate nature of knowledge, and the interac-
tive effects of researcher and researched are all important for con-
structive self-reflection. Philosophers and sociologists of science have
contributed substantially to our understanding of these issues. Current
1990l
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writing, especially from feminist and interpretivist scholars, has added
fresh insights and new dimensions for self-correction. 3 Within social
science and sociolegal work, despite some "straw-persons," there
have been useful cautions about excesses and biases in the past and
about limits on knowing that should inform our future.
One of the most insightful and constructive of these cautions was
recently published by Randall Collins.5 4 He examined how social sci-
ence comes to terms with subjectivist, interpretivist, reflexive, and
emergent critiques of science. He persuasively argues that one learns
from the various critiques and that these critiques are not necessarily
separate and apart from science, but part of the dialogue of doing
science in a better way. For those who value the process of learning
and the value of understanding without any illusion of the absolute
certainty of what we know, such critiques are instructive and integral
to the activity and integrity of science itself. We must keep in mind
that science is a social process and, like all social processes, it is dy-
namic, even at times erratic, but capable of change. Thus, the cri-
tiques are grist for doing science in a more profound way.
All of this said about value neutrality, objectivity, and the doing of
science, Trubek and I diverge less than this language suggests. There
may be a simple explanation underlying our apparent differences in
view. An obvious one is that he, of course, is trained in law, and I in
social science. This may account for some of the variance, but not all.
As much to the point, Trubek continues to see the law and society
enterprise as part of legal scholarship, and he is wary of language that
might imply an "exclusive jurisdiction"" over legal knowledge. Even
when Trubek considers social science, his frame of reference remains
the law school. Thus, his concern about privileging social science may
be understandable. I see law and society as a multidisciplinary en-
deavor that occurs in a wide number of institutional locations-in-
cluding the law school-and as neither being law-school or state-law
centered. Therefore, I worry less about privileging sociolegal studies
53. Among the leading philosophers of science framing feminist critiques in social science is
Sandra Harding. Her participation as the lead speaker at a plenary session on "Feminist Episte-
mology and Law and Social Science" at the 1989 annual meeting of the Law and Society Associ-
ation indicates the importance that sociolegal researchers place on serious consideration of these
issues. See S. HARDINO, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986); FEMINISM AND METHODOL-
OoY: SOCIAL SCIENCE ISSUEs (S. Harding ed. 1987). In each discipline, scholars are grappling with
the relationship between such critiques and social science inquiry. In psychology, see, e.g., Pe-
plau and Conrad, supra note 46; in anthropology, see, e.g., Stacey, Can There Be a Feminist
Ethnography, 11 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 21 (1988).
54. Collins, Sociology: Proscience or Antiscience? 54 Am. Soc. REv. 124 (1989).
55. Trubek, supra note 6, at 50.
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vis-a-vis law school work than about contributing more generally to
social knowledge.
IV. ACADEMIC AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOL
By focusing on law and society as a part of legal scholarship and as
essentially a movement within the law school world, Trubek presents a
rather circumscribed view of the scope of the field and what has been
achieved. Although perhaps not intended, the limitation of his con-
ception is nowhere better captured than toward the end of his paper
when he reflects, with quite positive affect, about the accomplish-
ments of the field:
The pioneers did accomplish something lasting. It is no small
achievement to have constituted a new object of inquiry in legal
studies.... It was a major accomplishment to open legal studies to
professional social scientists. And it was no mean feat for a basically
liberal movement of social science intellectuals to gain even a
foothold in the generally anti-intellectual and often politically
conservative environment of the law school. There was, indeed, a lot
to celebrate at the twentieth-fifth Anniversary party.56
Although I share Trubek's pleasure in this accomplishment, by defin-
ing what was gained from the vantage of only one of the originating
disciplines, the law school, he falls to see that sociolegal studies in its
first twenty-five years did that and so much more.
Law-trained colleagues may be especially inclined toward such a
frame of reference. State law is after all the exclusive subject of work
and study within the law school, and a majority of the work in law
and society has focused on processes, activities, and behaviors in rela-
tion to state law. Yet, although they may not think about their stand-
ing in law schools, colleagues trained in the other disciplines that
constitute sociolegal studies similarly consider the inroads that have
been made in gaining legitimacy and credibility in their fields. All of
these perspectives, however, reflect and reinforce dependencies that
do not adequately account for the growth of and intellectual opportu-
nities in sociolegal studies as an autonomous field.
In an article with Ronald M. Pipkin,5 7 I argued that the field of
sociolegal studies would be enriched by autonomous academic ar-
56. Id. at 48'(emphases added).
57. Levine & Pipkin, supra note 29.
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rangements dedicated to its development. Some of these infrastruc-
tural arrangements are already in place. Many colleges and
universities offer majors or concentrations in law and society, and tra-
ditional programs in criminology and criminal justice have broadened
their focus and even their names (e.g., to justice studies). In addition
to such activities in academic institutions, teaching materials of qual-
ity are now more readily available. Journals have proliferated from
initially two or three to currently more than two dozen. The growing
importance of specialized scholarly societies (e.g., the Law and Soci-
ety Association, the American Society of Criminology), the nature of
the work and the critical mass of scholars at research institutes (e.g.,
the American Bar Foundation, Rand's Institute for Civil Justice), and
the viability of funding sources (e.g., National Science Foundation's
Law and Social Science Program, the Fund for Research on Dispute
Resolution) are all indicators of growth. As important, parallel organ-
izational, academic, and scholarly efforts can be seen in other coun-
tries.
Although these infrastructural supports have been instrumental to
the growth of sociolegal studies, there is still a missing link: There are
few freestanding academic programs58 that fully integrate graduate
and undergraduate education. The presence of programs that have
their own integrity and are not in an adjunct status vis-a-vis other
fields and disciplines-including the law school-is especially impor-
tant from the vantage of the current state and future health of the
field. Joint programs and an inter-departmental model have worked
and continue to work reasonably well in attracting participants to this
arena of work. Yet, remaining embedded in the substance, reward
structure, and status hierarchy of other disciplines creates limitations
and distractions that can constrain the creativity of the field and in-
hibit the entry of the next generations.
In that earlier article,5 9 Pipkin and I weighed the intellectual and
strategic advantages and disadvantages of disciplinary autonomy and
urged both an independent conception of sociolegal studies and free-
standing academic units. I will not repeat our reasoning here. Most
important is that such autonomy focuses thinking about law and nor-
mative ordering in broad and generic terms. It places the center of
gravity not in state law but in law-related processes and behaviors that
occur in all social domains and over time and cultures. Also, it fosters
58. There are some notable exceptions: the Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program at the
University of California at Berkeley; the School of Justice Studies at Arizona State University;
and the Policy and Society Program at Northeastern University.
59. Levine & Pipkin, :",ora note 29.
"HIS" AND "HER" STORY
thinking in ways that value multiple methods and multi-disciplinary
integrations and that transcend traditional disciplinary or interdiscipli-
nary frameworks. Although no field is immune from complacency or
rigidity in its interests and priorities, an autonomous sociolegal studies
encourages new fusions and makes problematic professional and insti-
tutional definitions of law. To the extent that Trubek's critiques of
the original understanding of law and society are well founded, there
is much to be gained from thinking in autonomous terms.
This shift in emphasis does not mean that the law school world is
not or could not be an important part of the enterprise. As a fellow
traveler in law school circles since the early 1970's and as a missionary
at heart for sociolegal studies, I see changes in the role of empirical
scholarship in law school, and also I see potential for even greater
change in both the attitude and participation of law-trained scholars.
Others, with more "hands on" experience, seem to question this opti-
mism.60 They are less sanguine and emphasize that other intellectual
movements receive greater visibility in law school life (e.g., critical le-
gal studies, feminist jurisprudence, law and economics). As I see the
past, law-trained colleagues helped shape the field just as did sociolo-
gists, political scientists, anthropologists, and some other less well rep-
resented disciplines. 6' As I see the future, law school is likely a fertile
ground for new recruits and "converts," but certainly not the only
fertile ground nor any more central to sociolegal studies. 62
In looking toward the next generation of sociolegal scholars, it
would be valuable to continue to attract participants from the law
school world and especially to reach out to law students. But, in plan-
ning for the future, it is also important to realize that the field is not
exclusively located within the law school; nor is it a creature of legal
scholarship. Looking ahead and shifting the outreach as much to law
students as law faculty, it is with the long-term hope that law students
will more readily internalize the value of thinking broadly, empiri-
cally, and critically about law.
V. CONCLUSION: "HER" FINAL STORY
Interspersed in his paper, Trubek recounts "stories" of his personal
experiences that reveal the depth of his feelings and the range of his
activities. Through his stories, Trubek aims to depict his concerns
60. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 42; White, supra note 8; Trubek, supra note 6.
61. See supra pp. 70-72; see also, Levine, supra note 1, at 20 & n.32.
62. For an insightful appraisal of the history of empirical research in law schools and some
constructive strategies for change, see Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do.More Empirical
Research?, 39 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 323 (1989).
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about sociolegal studies and his conception of what the field is. In a
similar spirit, I conclude my paper with a "story" about the two of
us:
In 1974 I met with David Trubek and Marc Galanter, and they told
me about their aspirations for "independent centers or departments of
legal studies ' 63 that could help nurture and advance the law and soci-
ety idea of an autonomous field of law." I thought their vision was
plausible and desirable. It resonated with my own characterizations of
the field and my sense of identity. I found it invigorating to talk with
colleagues who shared a similar dream. I understood Trubek's frustra-
tions in meeting resistance in the Yale Law School to the vision he
preached. I realized that this effort to transform the social structure
of legal education or of the academy might take more time than could
be accomplished in our generation. I made that vision my agenda.
I worked at the American Bar Foundation through the 1970's with
that goal. I worked at the National Science Foundation through the
1980's and further saw the complexities but significance of forging
new fields and transforming the structure of science and social sci-
ence. I reflect on my friendship with Trubek over these decades as
having been built on a shared commitment to education and advocacy
about this vision. Progress has been made. There is more cohesion
and less opposition to what was once a curious, if not threatening,
idea. Trubek's vision made sense. It made a difference for the field
and for me that we talked back in 1974. It still can and does make a
difference.
63. Trubek, supra note 6, at 28-29.
64. In 1974, Marc Galanter first used the concept of autonomy in calling for "autonomous
social research on law." See Galanter, The Future of Law and Social Science Research, 52
N.C.L. REv. 1060 (1974).
